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Constituency Influence on Senate Voting: 
Public School Desegregation 
STEVEN A. SHULL 
University of New Orleans 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This research attempts to ascertain the correspondence between U.S. 
senator's voting behavior and constituency preferences across region and 
party on the narrow issue of desegregation of public schools. It is recognized 
that constituency influenc e for senators is likely to be harder to ascertain than 
for members of the House since it appears that senators are "less subject to 
constituency and partisan pressures. "1 Nevertheless, the Senate was selected 
partly because of the larger number and more varied roll-calls for the time 
frame under consideration (1969-70). 
Roll-calls have the advantage of being "hard ", quantifiable data , and 
constitute an important component oflegislative behavior . 2 umerous other 
factors, some of them exogenous, must be considered as well . Although the 
primary units of analysis in this resea rch for both constituents and senators are 
reg ion and party , numerous demographic and attribute characteristics will 
also be considered as determinants of attitudes (for constituents) and voting 
behavior (for legislators ). The roll-calls dealt with specific policy issues , while 
the SRC attitudinal questions were more amorphous cognitions. As with the 
Miller and Stokes study, 3 this research cannot tell how much control con-
stituent attitudes have over the roll-call behavior of senators, but it can 
suggest that it is an important influence not to be ignored . 
Repres entation 
The ancient concept of representation has received considerable 
philosophical discussion. 4 Legislators vary substantially in th eir style of rep-
'Aage R. Clausen and R. B. Cheney , "Comparative Analysis of Senate-House Voting on 
Economic and Welfare Policy: 1953-64," American Political Science Review, 64 (March, 1970), 
pp. 150-151. 
2Usefu1 evaluation s of roll-call analysis include : David B. Truman , The Congressional Party: 
A Case Study (New York: Wiley , 1959), p. ~2; Lee Anderson , et al. , Legislative Roll-Call Analysis 
(Evanston , Il1mo1s: Northwestern U111vers1ty Press , 1966); Dun can MacRae , Issues and Parties in 
Legislative Voting (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Wilder Crane , "A Caveat on Roll-Call 
Studies of Party Voting ," Midwest]oumal of Political Science, IV (August, 1960), pp. 237-249 ; 
Fred I. Greenstein and Alton F. Jackson, "A Second Look at the Validity of Roll-Call Analysis," 
Midwest j ournal of Political Science, VII (1963), pp. 156-166. 
3Warren E. Miller and Don aldhE . Stokes , "Constituency Influence in Congress ," A,nerican 
Political Science Review, 57 (1963), pp. 45-56. 
4 Most of the earlier definitions of representation are not useful for analytical research. An 
e_xte~.sive su~mary ~f.these i:nay be found in John A. Fairlie , "The ature of Political Rep rese nta-
tion, Amencan Political Science Review, 34 (April -Jun e, 1940), f p. 236-248, 456-466. Gilbert 
presents the philosophical basis for the following six intellectua traditions of representation : 
idealist , utilitarian, formalist , pragmatic, participatory , and populist (Charles E. Gilbert , "Opera-
tive Doctrines of Represe ntation ," American Political Science Review, 57 (1963). Other recent 
concept ual works include: H . Pitkin , Concept of Representatio n (Ber keley: University of Califor-
ma Press, 1967); J. Pennock and J. Chapman (eds .), Representat ion (Chicago: Atherton, 1968); 
and Neal Riemer, The Representati ve: Truste e? Delegate? Partisan? Politics? (Boston : Heath 
1967). ' 
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resentation and whether or not representatives are responsive to their con-
stituents' wishes has been widely debated in the literature. 5 Constituents 
seldom speak with a clear voice, and there is no district viewpoint on most 
issues. 6 Although this phenomenon leaves legislators substantial latitude in 
decision-making, there does appear to be a high degree of correspondence 
between senators and constituents on the general issue of civil rights for 
blacks. Empirical evidence has shown that race is perhaps the one issue on 
which congressmen are most in touch with their constituency. 7 Accordingly, 
one can expect to find a correlation between constituency and a senator's 
voting behavior on the more specific issue of school desegregation. 
Neither the legislator nor the constituent has a very good indication of each 
other's policy preferences. 8 The relationship that does exist between them 
appears generally to run in one direction since constituents have little know-
ledge of congressional attitudes or behavior on most issues. 9 Congressional 
affairs generally have a low visibility to the mass electorate, which exhibits 
little knowledge of the substantive issues under consideration. 10 
Cnudde and McCrone extended Miller and Stokes' analysis by focusing on 
the intervening path between the representative's attitude - a linkage that 
was unresolved by Miller and Stokes. Although Cnudde and McCrone were 
concerned only with the civil rights issue, they determined that Miller and 
Stokes had "underestimated the relative importance of the indirect impact of 
perception through congressional attitudes. "11 Although constituents do not 
select representatives om the basis of the legislator's attitudes, "representa-
tives are motivated to bring their own attitudes into line with their perception 
of constituency attitude. "12 
There is evidence 13 that those congressmen from competitive districts are 
more likely to be constituency-oriented, leading to the hypothesis that such 
5Those advocating constituency influence include : Duncan MacRae , Dimensions of Con-
gressional Voting (Berkeley: Unjyersity of California Press , 1958), p. 278; George B. Galloway, 
Legislative Process in Congress (New York: Crowell , 1955), pp . 198-215; Duncan MacRae, 
"Relation Between Roll Call Votes and Constituencies in the Massachusetts House ofReP.resenta-
tives", American Political Science Review, 46 (1952), pp. 1046-1055; Wilder Crane , Do Rep-
resentative Represent? ", Journal of Politics, 22 (1960), pp. 295-299. Other commentators 
believe constituency to be ofless salience to legislative behavior than commonly assumed; Donald 
E. Stokes and Warren Miller , '"Party Government and the Salience of Congress," Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 26 (1962), pp . 531-546; Miller and Stokes; and Roger Davidson, Role of the Con-
gressman (Indianapolis : Pegasus , 1969). 
6 Davidson , p. 120; Lewis A. Dexter , "Representative and His District, " Human Organiza-
tion, 16 (1947),/P· 2-13. 
7 Miller an Stokes, pp. 45-56. 
6Ibid. 
9lbid.; Warren E. Miller , " Majority Rule and the Representative System of Government ," 
in Allardt and Littunen (eds. ), Cleavages, Ideologies, and Party Systems : Contributions to 
Comparative Political Sociology, Westermarck Society, 1964, p. 345. 
10 Stokes and Miller . 
uc. F. Cnudde and D. J. McCrone , "Linkage Between Constituency Attitudes and Con -
gressional Voting Behavior: A Causal Model ," American Political Science Review 60 (March, 
1966), p . 72. 
12lbid., p. 70. 
13 Davidson , p. 141; Heinz Eulau , et al., "Role of the Representative ," American Political 
Science Review, 53 (1959), pp. 742-756. 
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congressmen will more closely approximate constituency attitudes on de-
segregated schools than congressmen from safe states. Miller's findings would 
suggest the opposite was true , however .14 Wolfinger and Hollinger found 
little difference between legislators from competitive and non-competitiv e 
districts .15 There is also some evidence for the proposition that senators from 
more heterogenous states enjoy greater isolation from constituency pressures 
than do those from more homogenous states. 16 
Partisanship 
Constituents and representatives are known to each other primarily by 
their party association. 17 Although party identification is the single most 
important variable explaining congressional voting behavior, constituency is 
the most salient factor explaining divergence from party position. 18 Thus , 
constituency characteristics seem to be related to partisanship in legislative 
behavior . The contrast between policy positions of Democrats and Republi-
cans in Congress is greater among legislators from safe districts and less among 
congressmen from marginal districts . Close electoral competition seems to 
limit the difference between policy alternatives offered the voters. 19 
Political parties take clearer ideological stands on some issues than on 
others. Yet party and constituency influences are often used to interpret the 
"facts" as members choose , reinforcing already held positions . 20 Party unity is 
more easily maintained on unimportant issues and those of little concern to 
legislators. 21 It appears that senators are less willing to submit to party 
leadership than members of the House . 22 Although the limitations of party 
influence have been widely discussed in the literature, 23 McRae found that 
Democrats are consistently more divided across a wide range of issues than are 
14 Miller , pp. 369, 373. 
15 Raymond Wolfinger and Joan Holling er, "Safe Seats , Seniority , and Power in Congr ess," 
American Political Science Review, 59 Oune, 1965), pp . 337-349. 
16 Donald R. Matth ews, U.S. Senators and Their World ( ew York: Vintage, 1960), p . 237. 
17 Miller and Stokes. 
18Truman ; MacRae, Dimensions of Congressional Votin g; Lewis A. From an and Randall 8 . 
Ripley, "Conditions for Part y Leadership : The Ca e of the Hou se Democrat s," American Political 
Science Review, 59 (March , 1965), pp . 52, 61; Julius Turner , Party and Constituency: Pressures 
on Congr ess (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Univer sity Press, 1951); Charl es Clapp , The Con-
~ressman : His Work As He Sees It (New York: Anchor , 1963), pp . 162-168; and Lewis A. Froman , 
Interparty Constituency Differences and Congr essional Voting Behavior ," American Political 
Science Review, 57 (March , 1963), pp . 57. 
19 Miller , p . 356. 
20 Lewi s A. Dexter, Sociology and Politics of Congr ess (Chicago : Rand Mc ally, 1969), pp . 
152-160; Theodore Lowi, "American Business , Public Policy, Case Studie s, and Political 
Theory ," World Politics, XVI Ouly, 1964), p . 684; Ralph Huitt , "Congre ssional Committ ee : A 
Case Study ," Am erican Political Science Review, 48 Uune, 1954), pp . 340-365, and Anthony 
Downs , Inside Bur eaucracy (Boston : Little , Brown, 1967), Ch. 15. 
21Cran e, "Caveat on Roll Call Studies of Party Voting ," p . 247. 
184
_ 
22 Randal B. Ripley , Majority Party Leadership in Congress (Boston : Little , Brown , 1969), p. 
23Truman , p . 95; Ralph K. Huitt , "Democratic Party Lead ership in the Senate ," Am erican 
Political Science Review, 55 Oune , 1961), pp . 331-344. 
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Republicans. 24 Clausen's research confirmed MacRae ' s fmding , at least on the 
issue of civil rights. 25 Democrats also differ from Republicans in that they 
represent more liberal districts , 26 and are less likely to be constituency-
oriented . 27 Also, Southerners from both parties tend to have lower party 
loyalty scores than non-Southern legislators. 28 
Region and Personal Dimensions of Voting Behavior 
It is likely that there are influences other than party and constituency that 
affect a senator 's voting behavior on desegregation of schools. Research has 
detected numerous variables that seem to be related to legislative decision-
making. 29 This paper contends that election margin , age, seniority , and 
region should be considered in addition to constituency attitudes as determin-
ants of legislative behavior. Region is of particular concern in this research 
effort . 
The "socialization process within a given state is unique", 30 and senators 
from the same state are likely to have similar voting records . 31 An important 
thesis of this paper, however , is that personal and state characteristics can 
meaningfully be aggregated to the region level. Wolfinger and Hollinger 
found that divisiveness within the Democratic Party is largely a result of 
urban/rural split and regional differences. 32 Clausen detected that combining 
state and region into a contrived variable was important in explaining variance 
on all five policy dimensions he considered (civil rights , foreign policy , 
economic , agriculture, and welfare). 33 Particularly germane to the present 
study is that Clausen's region/state variable accounted for substantially more 
of the unexplained variance on the civil rights dimension than any of the other 
issue-areas for both the 85th and 86th Congresses . 
II. METHODOLOGY 
All Senate roll-calls dealing with education were collected for both sessions 
of the 91st Congress from the Congressional Quarterly Almanac . The votes 
24 Duncan Mac Rae, "A Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes," 
American Political Science Reoiew, 59 (1965), pp. 909-926. 
••Aage R. Clausen , How Congressmen Decide (New York: St. Martins , 1973). 
57. 
26 Froman , "Interparty Constituency Difference s and Congre ssional Voting Behavior ," p . 
27 Davidson , p . 130. 
281 bid ., p . 158. 
29 See for example, Lee F. Anderson , "Individuality in Voting in Congress : A Rese arch 
Note ," Midwest Journal of Political Science, VIII (November , 1964), pp . 425-429; Thom as Flinn 
and Harold Wolman, "Constituency and Roll-Call Votin~: Case of the Southern Democratic 
Congressman ," Midwest Journal oj Political Science, X (1966), pp . 192-199; Lewis Froman , 
"Impact of Individualism in Voting in Congress ," Journal of Politics, XXV (May 1963), pp . 
324-332. 
30 Aage R. Clausen, "Home State Influence on Congressional Voting ," American Political 
Science Association Convention Paper (September 1970), p . 16. 
31 Matthews , p . 231. 
32 Wolfmger and Hollinger . 
33 Clausen , How Congressmen Decide. 
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covered many issue areas that were only tangentially related . Because of the 
divergence of these issues and because of uncertainty that they measure a 
common dimension of support for education, it was deemed necessary to 
perform scaling operations to ascertain which dimension(s) were operative in 
senators' voting decisions. Scale analysis 34 was selected in lieu of such 
techniques as factor analysis, which may take the data out of a form usable in 
further research. 
Roll-calls were required to exhibit at least a 10% disagreement level (e.g. 
90-10) to be included in the analysis. These votes were more likely to be 
substantive amendments while the near unanimous roll-calls tended to be 
those votes on the final passage of a bill. This cutting point is admittedly 
arbitrary and is not dependent upon the number of senators actually present 
and voting. Anderson et al. discuss alternative measures of contestability of 
roll-calls. 35 The roll-calls were cross-tabulated with one another using the 
Correl package of Osiris to determine which votes correlated highly. A Yule's 
Q value of ±. 70 was the cutting point to determine whether votes would be 
considered as possibly scalar. 36 After scale values were attributed to each pair 
of roll-calls , they were clustered by a technique suggested by Aage Clausen. 37 
The clusters that result do not indicate why legislators voted similarly, but 
merely present groups of issues in which substantial voting agreement occur-
red. The clusters were required to be mutually exclusive in order to avoid an 
artificial relationship between them. The technique is basically similar to one 
utilized by Duncan MacRae. 38 
Only the primary cluster was utilized in the analysis, and of the twenty 
roll-calls in that cluster, twelve dealt with some aspect of the issue of desegre-
gation in the public schools. These twelve votes were used in constructing a 
34 Helpful sources on scaling include MacRae , Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting; 
Anderson et al., Legislative Roll Call Analysis; Charles D . Farris, "A Method of Determining 
Ideological Groupings in Congress, "journal of Politics, XX (May 1958), pp . 308-338; and George 
Belknap, "A Method for Analyzing Legislative Behavior ," Midwest journal of Political Science, II 
( ovember, 1958), pp. 377-402. 
35 Legislative Roll Call Analysis, pp . 79 ff; see also Farris , p. 310. 
36 MacRae chose ± .80 as the threshold value , as it is "high enough to separate distinct issues 
but low enough to include a sufficient number ofroll-calls in the scale clusters to permit inferences 
about them" ("Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes"). The lesser 
criterion of ±. 70 was deemed adequate for this research as it allowed retention of some data that 
would otherwise have been lost . Also, the ±. 70 cutting point eems to be a reasonable com-
promise between the .5 to .9 range that others have used , and it is not without precedent itself 
(see for example, Clausen and Cheney, pp. 139-140). 
37 0ne begins by selecting the two roll-calls that correlate most highly with each other. Then 
the vote is selected that is correlated the highest with both of those two votes. The next step is a 
simple chaining operation adding the roll-call that has the highest correlation with each one 
preceding until all subsequent votes have been included. One may then reproduce the complete 
correlation matrix by merely submitting the program with the variables (roll-calls in this case) as 
reordered . For additional sources on clustering, see: Anderson , et al., Legislative Roll Call 
Analysis, Ch. 4; MacRae , "Method for Identifying Issues and Factions from Legislative Votes"; 
MacRae , Issues and Parties in Legislative Voting ; John G. Crumm , "Systematic Analysis of Blocs 
in the Study of Legislative Behavior, " Western Political Quarterly, XVIII Gune, 1965), pp. 
350-362 . 
38Dimensions of Congressional Voting . 
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libera lism-conservatism (civil rights ) index on the issue of school desegrega-
tion . The difficulty with constructing such an index (or any index ) is the 
uncertainty that the items included are unidimensional. 39 The scaling and 
subsequent clustering operations were empirical tests to help identify , as 
much as possible , whether such unidimensionality exists. 
A score of 1-7 was given to each senator for each of the twelve roll-calls. 
This scoring technique is adapted partly from Truman 's earlier work , 40 and is 
based on th e assumption that it is more accurate to rely on all available 
information than on a simple yea/nay dichotomy such as is used in Guttman 
scaling . After it was ascertained whether a yea was a positive (i.e . liberal ) vote, 
the coding scheme utilized was as follows: 
libera l conservative 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
voted paired announced ? announced paired voted 
yea yea or CQ poll nay nay nay 
yea 
Although others have omitted categories 2-6, it is contended here that these 
intervals also constitute a measure of attitude on an issue. The extreme scores , 
of course, reflect greater intensity of ideological position for the particular 
roll-call under consideration . Mean scores were computed for each senator 
across geographic region and political party . 
Roll-calls do not always provide a clear ideological orientation on an issue , 
even when statistically manipulated through scaling, clustering , or factor 
analysis for common dimensions of voting behavior. Although the present data 
indicates that most senators vote in a fairly consistent (and hence predictable ) 
manner, some are impossible to evaluate. Sen . Margaret Chase Smith (R, 
Maine), for example , had exactly six perfect liberal responses (1) and six 
perfec t conserva tive responses (7). One would normally expect a conservative 
senator to deviate slightly in the indicator from 4-7 but rarely to cross over into 
the 1-3 range. Although perfect scales do not occur in the reality of social 
science resea rch , Farris argues that legislators tend to maintain enough 
consistency on th e same major issue to have scalable votes. 41 The data herein 
generally confirms that judgment with a few minor exceptions. 
This research assumes that legislators can be ranked on "representative-
ness" as determin ed by the relationship between their roll-call behavior and 
constituency attitudes (also measured on a liberaVconservative index). It is 
39Anderson , et al. , Legislative Roll-Call Analysis, p . 27. 
40'frum an, p. 327. 
41 Farris , pp. 308-314. 
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assumed that the index for both constituents and senators may be an indication 
of intensity of opinion on the issue of desegregation in the public schools. It is 
possible that the issue of desegregated schools is not as unidimensional as it 
appears, since different indicators were used for constituents and senators. 
The constituency continuum ofliberalism-conservatism is based on responses 
to attitudinal items from the 1968 SRC election study. 
Constituency attitudes on the dimension of school desegregation were 
indexed in essentially the same manner as were the roll-calls for senators, 
although a lower Yule's Q value was accepted (±. 50). Eleven items fit the 
scalar pattern , but since they did not have the same response pattern , they all 
had to be recorded (via ICON ) into a trichotomy (liberal-moderate-
conservative). As with the roll-calls , the issues had to be coded (revers ed in 
some cases) so that all response codings ran in the same direction. 
A one-way analysis of variance subroutine of Osiris (called F Means 1) 
provided a mean summary score for each constituent across the eleven items , 
forming an index of liberalism/conservatism toward school desegregation. 
Filter variables (controls ) aggregated this data by region and party , giving a 
mean score on the same eight data points (four regions , two parti es) as 
appeared for senators. Product-moment correlations were then calculated in 
order to ascertain what relationship exists between constituent attitudes and 
roll-call voting on the desegregation dimension across region and party. 
Additionally , partial correlations allowed consideration of the effects of con-
stituent attitudes independent of demographic and personal attribute vari-
ables. 
The analysis in this research is, of course, limited to the time frame of the 
91st Congress (1969-70) and the 1968 SRC election study for roll-call behavior 
and constituency attitudes respectively. No attempt is made to suggest that 
the findings are applicable over a longer period of time . 42 This study avoids 
the problem of encountered by Miller and Stokes of sample reliability , in 
which congressional districts as the units of analysis have unequal sampling 
probability. 43 Each of the four geographic regions herein constitute a rep-
resentative sample in itself , and weighting problems are thus reduced. It was 
still necessary to weight each of the four regions according to their proportion-
ate members of respondents and senators. At least for the constituency 
attributes, the data can not be broken down into any smaller units (such as 
states) within the four regions without violating the sampling assumptions. 44 
42 For a discu ssion of the difficulti es involved in longitudinal analysis oflegislative voting , se!l 
Aage R. Clausen, "Measureme nt Identity in the Longitudinal Analysis of Legislative Voting , ' 
American Political Science Review, 61, no. 4 {December, 1967), pp. 1020-1035. 
43 Miller and Stokes, p. 32. 
44 lt was discovere d midway through the analysis that a black suppleme nt is automatically 
included in all data unless it is purposely filtere d out. Thus, the often used 1673 cases of the 1968 
Survey Research Center Election Study is not a random samp le as it includes an extra 116 blacks 
in addition to their representative numbers in the samp le itself {l557 cases). This group of blacks 
was excluded because the black supplement itself is not a rep resentative samp le, making even an 
analysis of black attitudes of dubious value . 
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III . FI DINGS 
The first consideration in examining the results of this research effort is to 
recognize that all variables were aggregated in terms of region and/or party . 
This has the disadvantage of eliminating more extreme scores that may be 
interesting and useful in studying representation. It is not entirely accurate in 
this study to compare distances on the scale scores for constituents with those 
of legislators since the constituency index has only three intervals while the 
index for senators consists of seven. It is still possible to recognize , however , 
that there is less variation in constituent scores than those oflegislators. This 
finding is not unexpected, as we would anticipate constituents to group toward 
central or moderate positions , even on such a sensitive issue as school de-
segregation. At a later stage in the analysis a simple linear transformation was 
performed on the constituent scores to make them equivalent to the seven-
point scale of senators' scores. 
In looking at constituent results (Table I) we see that Republican respon-
dents were consistently more conservative on the issue of school desegrega-
tion than their Democratic counterparts across each region . The greatest 
regional-party difference illustrated that North-eastern and Southern Demo-
crats had more liberal attitudes than Republicans from those two regions . In 
terms of constituency characteristics (Table II ), it is not unexpected to find 
that the South had the lowest level of education while the Far West had the 
highest. It may be that education is related to one 's tolerance for integrated 
schools since the South as a region had the most conservative attitude, while 
respondents from the Far West were the most liberal. This finding , however , 
may be more a function of the percentag e of black population of the two 
regions. Again , the Far West and South were the extremes with 2.18% and 
21.6 % respectively. Cynics might argue that it is easy to support integration 
when one is not faced with the prospect personally. Another demographic 
factor that may affect constituent attitudes is the urban /rural split. The find-
ings herein illustrate that the two regions with the highest percentage of urban 
dwellers (Northeast and Far West) had the most liberal attitudes while the two 
regions with the least urban population had the most conservative scores 
(Midwest and South ). 
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TABLE I. Mean Constituency Scores (Var . X) on School De egregation (By Region and Party) 
WEIGHTED 
RECIO PARTY TOTALS 
Democrats Republican s 
ortheast 1.865 2.080 1.96 
(180) (138) (318) 
Midwest 1.993 2.081 2.02 
(240) (170) (410) 
South 2.048 2.251 2.10 
(306) (110) (416) 
Far West 1.90 2.020 1.94 
(132) ( 92) (224) 
Weighted 
Totals 1.972 2.106 1.99 
(858t (510) (1368) 
a umbers in parenthese s represent s 
(Ind ex based on 11 SRC issues) 
Liberal Con ervative 
1 2 3 
TABLE II. Con tituent Demographic Characteristics 
RECIO % BLACK % URBA AGE EDUCATIO 
ortheast 5.0 70.8 31.2 10.79 
(10) 
Midwest 4.4 60.1 29.3 10.67 
(12) 
South 21.6 56.0 27.2 9.37 
(15) 
Far West 2.2 67.6 27.4 11.85 
(11) 
=( 48) 9.4a 62.8 28.6 10.56 
a 
weighted mean s 
This study confirm Clausen's finding that Democratic legislators are less 
ideologically cohe ive than Republicans , 45 at least on the issue of school 
desegregation. Democratic senators had by far the most extreme score on the 
issue (range for Democrats = 4.35, for Republicans = 2.62), while Republi-
cans tended to cluster more toward the center of the continuum (Table III). 
The opposite was true for constituents, the range for Democrats being .183 
and for Republicans .231. Democratic senators (with the exception of South-
erners) had considerably more liberal voting records than did Republican 
senators. 
45 Clausen , How Congressmen Decide . 
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TABLE ID. Mean Scores for Senators (Var. Y) on School Desegregation {By Region and Party ) 
WE IGHTED 
REGION PARTY TOTALS 
Northeast 
Midwest 
South 
Far West 
Democrats 
1. 74 
( 9) 
1.38 
(13) 
5.73 
(22) 
2.88 
(13) 
Republicans 
2.17 
(11) 
3.94 
(11) 
4.46 
( 8) 
4.79 
( 9) 
Weighted 
Totals 3.46 3.74 
(57) (39) 
Liberal (Ind ex based on 12 school desegregation roll-calls) 
(36) (12) ( 7) ( 5) (12) 
1 2 3 4 5 
TABLE IV. Senators' Personal Characteristics 
REGION % ELECTION MARGIN AGEa 
Dem. Rep. Dem. Rep. 
Northeast 65.0 59.9 55 62 
( 9) (10) ( 9) (11) 
Midwest 56.3 58.9 53 57. 
(13) (10) (13) (10) 
South 70.9 55.8 62 52 
(21) ( 8) (22) ( 8) 
Far West 57.9 54.3 59 58 
(13) ( 9) (13) ( 9) 
Totals 57.3 57.4 58.2 57.6 
(56) (37) (57) (38) 
GM=57.3b GM=58.0 
aAverage age in 1969 
bWeighted totals and grand mean 
(24) 
6 
1.98 
(20) 
2.55 
(24) 
5.39 
(30) 
3.66 
(22) 
3.57 
(96) 
Conservative 
7 
SENIORITY 
Dem. Rep. 
28.5 15.1 
( 9) (11) 
33.7 19.2 
(13) (10) 
21.3 27.8 
(22) ( 8) 
25.0 23.8 
(13) ( 9) 
26.1 20.9 
(57) (38) 
GM=24 .0 
Differences in the personal attributes of senators as illustrated in Table IV 
(and in graphic form which will be provided to the interested reader ) may help 
to explain their voting behavior . As might be expected, Southern Democrats 
were elected by the largest percentages , while Far Western Republicans had 
the closest election victories. The Republican Party as the minority party 
generally won by a smaller margin than the Democratic Party . Republicans 
with closer election margins tended to vote more conservatively on desegre-
gation of schools than did those with higher margins of victory. Although the 
findings on this variable are somewhat less clear for Democrats , both Demo -
crat and Republican senators from the region with the closest average election 
margins had the most liberal voting records . 
22 Jo u R AL OF POLITI CAL SCIEN CE 
Democrats in the 91st Congr ess wer e only slightly older than Republicans , 
while Southern senators were the oldest of the Democrats and the youngest of 
the Republicans . It is likely that all thre e of the legislator attribute variables 
discussed here are related. For example, the oldest group of senators in each 
party were also those that had the greatest election margins as well as the most 
seniority. Older Democrats tend ed to vote more conservatively on school 
desegregation , while older Republicans had the most liberal voting record 
among Senators from their party. This finding is, of course, related to region 
since Southerners were both the oldest Democrats and the youngest Republi-
cans . 
In terms of intra-party seniority, the contrast is again on Southern 
senators. They had by far the most seniority among Democrats , but the least 
among Republicans. Senior Democrats voted increasingly conservative on 
school desegregation , but senior Republicans had more liberal voting reco rds . 
As a result of this fmding and that in the above paragraph , we can conclude 
that the hypothesis that younger and junior senators are more likely to support 
integration is confirmed for Democrats but disconfirmed for Republicans. As a 
result of the interrelationship of these variables with each other and with 
region , it was felt that it would be useful to perform partial correlations to 
control for the ind ependent effect of these variables on voting behavior . 
One must recognize that the correlations presented herein are of dubious 
value , since there are only eight points to the data . Since the constituent 
demographic variables were not available by party , the variables had to be 
collapsed into the four regional groupings allowing only four data points. As a 
result, the subsequent correlational analysis for the constituent variables is 
even more questionable , particularly since it exhausts the available degrees of 
freedom. 
With these caveats in mind , the findings indicated a positive correlation of 
.494 between constituency attitude and senators' roll-call votes . There ap-
pears to be only a slight relationship between the senators' voting behavior 
and the personal characteristics isolated in this study (% election margin r = 
.197, age r = .234). The third variable, seniority, was negatively correlated 
with vote (r = - .277), but this is possibly a function of the fact that seniority 
scores represent intra-party seniority and do not mean the same thing for 
Democrats and Republicans. 
In terms of constituency characteristics (again recognizing that only four 
data points exist), there was a very strong positive relationship (r = . 907) 
between attitude and percent black , while there was also a strong negative 
relationship (r = - . 929) between attitude and percent urban in the four 
geographic regions. The correlation for constituent attitudes and senators' 
roll-call behavior increased from r = .494 with eight data points tor= .690 
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with four, confirming that the earlier expressed caution in interpreting of the 
results of these correlations was well-justified. Part of this divergence can be 
explained by the fact that the latter calculation was computed with weighted 
observations while the former was not. The problems discussed above of 
interpreting bivariate relationships also apply to the partial correlations in this 
study. When the effects of percent election margin and age are eliminated, the 
correlation between constituent attitudes and senators' voting behavior is 
reduced to r = .154 and r = .183 resp ectively . 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The results of this study do indicate some correspondence between consti-
tuency attitudes and senators' roll-call behavior on the issue of public school 
desegregation. The linear transformation of constituent scores in Table V 
illustrates that constituent attitudes are far less dispersed than senators' voting 
behavior on this issue. With an expanded data base , a two-way analysis of 
variance would be a useful technique to determine whether the differences in 
means are statistically significant. Although it is difficult to make even tenta-
tive judgments about representation in the absence of such measures, some 
preliminary statements are offered here . 
TABLE V. Comparison of Constituent and Senators ' Scores 
REGION AND PARTY CONSTITUENTS a (X) 
Northeast 
Dem . 
Rep. 
Midwest 
Dem. 
Rep. 
South 
Dem. 
Rep. 
Far West 
Dem. 
Rep. 
Grand mean= 
(x) (x-x) 
4.57 .07 
4.35 .29 
4.85 -. 21 
4.71 -.07 
4.64 0 
4.85 -.21 
4.89 -.43 
4.77 -. 13 
5.24 -.60 
4.52 .12 
4.43 .21 
4.71 -. 07 
4.64 
asimp le linear transformation from Table I 
SENATORS (Y) 
(y) (y-ij) 
1. 98 1.59 
1. 74 1.83 
2.17 1.40 
2.55 1.02 
1.38 2.19 
3.94 - .37 
5.39 -1.82 
5.73 -2.16 
4.46 - .89 
3.66 - .09 
2.88 .69 
4.79 -1.22 
3.57 
The present fmdings are convincing that regional-party grouping is a 
useful level of analysis. It appears that the region whose attitudes are the least 
reflected by legislators is the Far West. While it is the most liberal region in 
terms of average constituent response on the index , it has conservative 
legislators who are more liberal only than Southern Democrats. Also, it seems 
that Democratic senators from the Far West more closely approximate the 
region's wishes than do their Republican counterparts. 
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The goal of determining the level of representativeness that exists is 
suggested in this data but is perhaps too ambitious to be ascertained with 
certainty from these preliminary findings . It appears likely that this relation-
ship can be measured more clearly only by disaggregating the data to the state 
level, for both senators and constituents. While this would have the disadvan-
tage of eliminating the representativeness of the constituent sample , it would 
allow greater perception in the constituency-representative linkage than the 
present study affords . It would have the additional advantage of being more 
likely to represent constituent views than studies using the congressional 
district as the unit of analysis because of the very small number of cases 
present in those studies. 
